Deal Or No Deal!

Iraq-U.S Security Pact.

U.S. and other multinational forces have been in Iraq since 2003 under a UN Security Council mandate, which is renewed annually, yet is set to expire on December 31. This year Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki requested that the United Nations not renew the mandate again. This effectively forced negotiations for a detailed legal framework for the U.S. presence in the country and without a status of forces agreement (SOFA) it is questionable whether the U.S. will have a legitimate right to maintain its troops in Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi officials began negotiations in March on a blueprint for the long-term security agreement and a second deal, to establish the legal basis for U.S. troops to remain in the country after the U.N. mandate runs out. But negotiations with such a fragile country and war-mongering administration have not been easy, since talks have been stalled by a number of issues, most predominantly the issue of legal immunity for U.S. troops.
Plans for the future US presence in Iraq has reached crunch-time for the Bush administration, and any long-term agreement with Iraq’s government could shape legal, economic, cultural, and security relations. As the US presidential election looms negotiations over a security agreement between the US and Iraq have accelerated to the extent that both state officials have now agreed on the wording of a draft accord. This week the draft which currently requires American forces to withdraw from towns and villages to their main bases by June 2009, and to leave Iraq completely by the end of 2011. In addition to the continuance of US soldiers to be subject to American Law while on base, but outside base soldiers are subject to Iraqi Law; will face its first test this week by Iraq’s top political leaders. It is to be forwarded to the country's cabinet for approval. It then falls to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his ministers to forward the draft to parliament to be critically assessed by the three-man Presidency Council and Council of Representatives, whereby opposition against the deal will ineviabtly be intense due to the coalition of parties, hence further delays.
The Draft Agreements
Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker, testifying before Congress in April 2008, said two separate accords are on the table. The first is a status-of-forces agreement, called a SOFA, which would codify legal protections for U.S. military personnel and property in Iraq. Such agreements already govern U.S. military conduct in other long-term deployment zones, including Germany, Japan and South Korea, and the administration has characterized talks for a SOFA in Iraq as a hopeful step towards stability.
Details of the second agreement are less transparent. Referred to as a strategic framework agreement, the measure would broadly address issues not covered by the SOFA, including those outlined in a ‘declaration of principles’ document President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed in November 2007. These broad issues include the U.S. role in defending Iraq from internal and external threats, its support of political reconciliation and its efforts to confront terrorist groups.

What the U.S originally wanted

In June the US leaked plans exposing secret policies to keep Iraq under its control. The terms of this original deal detailed the permanent occupation by US troops, conducting military operations and the ability to arrest Iraqi’s and enjoy immunity from Iraqi law. Such a deal would have continued the American military occupation of Iraq indefinitely, regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November.

Writer Seumas Milne for the Guardian argued that the deal George Bush and Dick Cheney was seeking is ‘strikingly’ similar to the treaty imposed by Britain in 1930 on its ‘puppet government’. Mile argues that five years on the US administration, “are putting the screws on their Green Zone government to sign a secret deal for indefinite military occupation, which would effectively reduce Iraq to a long term vassal state,” he writes.
Nevertheless if this deal was to be put into force, not only would it threaten to provoke a political crisis amongst the Iraqi population, but it would allow President Bush to finally declare some sort of superficial victory and claim his 2003 invasion to be vindicated. As Writer Peter Cockburn suggests in the Independent, “The timing of the agreement would also boost the Republican candidate, John McCain, who has claimed the United States is on the verge of victory in Iraq – a victory that he says Mr Obama would throw away by a premature military withdrawal.”
These critics contend that the Bush administration aims to tie the hands of the next president and usurp Iraqi sovereignty; however these criticisms were strongly disputed by the White House.
What Iraq wanted from the security deal?
For the past year Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki has spoken in detail about a deal to bring an end to the foreign combat troop presence in the country. For Maliki the security agreement would lead to the withdrawal of the troops by 2011 and essentially allow Iraq to slowly regain political sovereignty over its state. President Jalal Talabani told state television this week that, "There is a mutual desire to sign this agreement because it is necessary for Iraq's development, to safeguard oil resources, to enable Iraqi forces to handle security and to complete our national independence." It is clear that Iraq does not want an immediate withdrawal, as that could spark an insurgency leading to further political instability in the region. What they do want is a deal that will secure Iraqi boarders and tame inter-political tensions, which recent reports have suggested have spun off to Afghanistan, since Iraqi civilian violence has decreased. Unlike the US, Iraq is a strategically sensitive region and any deal it makes has to also play along with Iran, the Shia clerics and the Iraqi population as a whole.
Delays with the Orders!
Surprisingly the original orders that the Bush administration set out, did not bode very well with the Iraqi government (sense the sarcastic tone). Consequently for months the deal has stalled since the Iraqis and Americans have been deadlocked over Iraq’s insistence that U.S. soldiers should not be exempt from Iraqi law. Western officials and Iraqis have also faulted the American side for a poor start to the negotiation process last spring, when its negotiators made demands deemed way too high, including insisting on the right to conduct operations without Iraqi approval. As of the last week Prime Minister Maliki has had to seek concessions from the US over the accord, which incurred further delays over the deal.
By far the most contentious issue is the question of immunity, which American forces and Pentagon civilian contractors currently enjoy. Mr al-Dabbagh, the Iraqi government spokesman, said that from January 1 Iraq would be able to prosecute US troops if they committed crimes outside their bases while off duty or on unauthorised missions. They could be held under US custody but would have to appear for questioning by Iraqi investigators and for trial in an Iraqi court. This immunity deal is not essentially what the US oringinally envisaged but it is a concession which has had to be made if any deal is to be signed. This is because Iraqis have been enraged by a series of atrocities committed by US forces, who in their eyes appear to get away with murder. In the most notorious case a 14-year-old girl was raped and killed by US paratroopers, along with three of her family members being murderd in Mahmoudiya, south of Baghdad. Consequently Iraqi civilians have added to the demands for tougher rules.
The biggest problem for Mr. Maliki is to strike a balance between the US security agreement and the Iraqi population. The sheer arrogance of the US original orders for the agreement has not only created further problems for Mr. Maliki’s own prime ministerial career; since provincial elections are soon approaching, but have also raised worries within Iraq’s Shiite blocs. The accord remains unstable when you have Shiite clerics rallying protest every Friday Sermon and most recently on Saturday whereby 150,000 protesters staged a demonstration against the agreement. Moreover thirty lawmakers aligned with anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr have already said they would oppose the deal. The Iraqi Parliament alone has also stirred the wooden spoon, as independent members have said that the Iraqi government’s indication that there had been significant progress on the security agreement was overblown. Anonymously speaking one member said, “In Parliament it will face a lot of opposition.”
Nonetheless there is still hope for Mr. Maliki obtaining approval for the accord as Iraq’s most influential Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani assured Mr. Maliki that he would not stand in the way of the pact if approved in Parliament. If the draft gets to the 275-member parliament, it will require a simple majority for passage and approval from Kurdish and Shiite lawmakers, who control a majority of seats in parliament and have traditionally voted together, would be enough to pass the deal.
Political analysts agree that the elections are making it difficult for Mr. Maliki to stand alongside Americans, especially on an agreement that hinders Mr. Maliki’s withdrawal plans. Provincial elections are likely to be held early next year and this made Mr. Maliki very anxious about maintaining his political power. Senior Iraq analyst at the International Crisis Group office in Istanbul, Joost Hiltermann held,
“I think the main thing is that Maliki is worried about the provincial elections, and he doesn’t want to be seen as making concessions to the Americans.”

Evidently Iraq is biding time for positioning, making sure all the key elements of the security pact uphold Iraqi sovereignty, however both Iraqi and US leaders are up against the clock with upcoming US elections and a Iraq vote in January. Thus pitching the pact to lawmakers in Baghdad and Washington is not a simple process and as the deal unravels, further political and military risks are exposed which has added to the postponement.
"We're going through a smoke-and-mirrors process," says Toby Dodge, an Iraq analyst at Queen Mary, University of London. "Maliki is positioning himself for the most nationalistic result [but he also] knows how much he needs the Americans."
However it is possible that deliberate delays could cloud the judgements of the Iraqi Parliament and this might possibly be coming from the growing pressure from Iraq’s powerful majority Shia neighbour, Iran. Independent Kurdish lawmaker, Mahmoud Othman commented on the Iranian issue stating that, “The situation is very muddy right now and none of the neighbouring countries are enthusiastic about it,” he added. “Iran is strongly trying either to delay it or not have it signed; Syria is doing the same. Turkey is also not for it to be signed quickly.” Mr. Maliki has reassured Iran that they will not become the victim of any security deal between Iraq and the US, but since Syria and Iran have little on no diplomatic relations with the US, they ultimately view American troop presence as interference in the region. At the end of the day the political stalemate between Iran and the US has brushed off on Iraq and Mr. Maliki not only has to gain acceptance from the Iraqi population and Parliament but also from its neighbouring country Iran. Thus Inter-Shia political tensions affect the whole neighbouring community and not just parties within Iraqi boarders.
Bush Bows to Obama?
The implications of the deal which is now pending ratification from the Iraqi government, seems to have not only proved that the US have given ground to the Iraqi government, but also bowed to the demands of Obama who argued for troop withdrawal by 2010, which is a much step closer compared to McCain’s no timetable approach. Original US motivations were arguable similar to that of the British imperial motives when they occupied Iraq and this has in-avertedly added panic to the Iraqi’s as it reminds them of their experience with the British. Steven Simon, a CFR expert on U.S. security policy in the Middle East, says Iraqi opposition is rooted in five decades of post-colonial history. Thus the mooted deal illustrates that time is running out for the US administration and President Bush is trying his best not to leave the White House with the legacy of a war-monger. By making the concessions for American troops to be subjected to Iraqi laws if crimes were made outside their base as well as the timetable for withdrawal; it shows that Iraq has in some form or other managed to break free from the its puppet strings and actually apply the laws which uphold Iraqi sovereignty.
Either way if the draft agreement gets ratified before the new Presidential candidate arrives, then Bush may be able to leave office with the gratification that his Iraq policy had finally produced a success. The fact that President Bush never wanted timetables for withdrawal suggests that he had to move quickly and make concessions with Mr. Maliki in order for him to even consider such an agreement. It is clear that the war-monger is now pursuing a victory based on any form and coincidently Bush’s ‘mini me’ McCain has fortunately been able to sit quiet since his last statement, ‘I will bring out troops home in victory and honour.’
Interestingly the British soldiers serving in Iraq are likely to be subject to the new rules from the next year. The Ministry of Defence for the British Forces stated that, “Our requirements are very similar to those of the US. We intend to use the Iraqi/US text as the basis of out agreement.” This obviously is just a further shake off of Iraq from Prime Minister Gordon Brown and reflects relatively no debate on the matter, other than continuing political pandering to the Bush administration Iraq policy.
One must take into account the fact that the US-Iraq security pact has come a long way since any deals were put on the table. The US was the first to get rid of its poker face, since its imperial requests to take hold of Iraq were never going to receive acceptance from Mr. Maliki. Despite the concessions that were subsequently made by the US, the initial colonial plans worried many top Iraqi officials and triggered many inter-Shia political tensions, inside and outside Iraqi borders and this as a result has further stalled any agreement. The draft deal now lies in the hands of the Iraqi Parliament and if a deal is sought, the question that will remain is whether the accords very principles will be binding, or will it just be another UN Mandate committing Washington to Iraqi sovereignty and once again hindering any attempt for Iraqi governance to protect its own national sovereignty.
By Nisha Chopra
20/10/2008